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1-CLICK ENERGY: MANAGING CORPORATE 
DEMAND FOR CLEAN POWER 
GINA S. WARREN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Globally, more private businesses, especially Fortune 100 com-
panies are generating their own electricity, investing in renewable 
energy facilities, and voluntarily purchasing renewable energy 
credits to cover their carbon footprints.  This shift could have a 
significant impact on the existing energy delivery system.  On the 
one hand, this shift shows positive momentum toward the incorpo-
ration of clean energy into a fossil fuel dominated grid.  As the 
negative impacts of climate change accelerate around the globe, 
decreasing reliance on fossil fuels is certainly an important goal.  
On the other hand, corporate disruption of what has historically 
been a highly regulated public service industry could result in a 
slippery slope of market power and loosened consumer protec-
tions, lost profits and stranded costs for utilities, and increased 
utility bills for the remaining customers.  This Article recommends 
changes to the current regulatory scheme that would (1) go further 
to protect customers from multinational corporate wholesale 
sellers of electricity and (2) allow utilities to plan and collaborate 
earlier with large corporate customers to meet their clean energy 
demands. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Corporate demand for clean energy skyrocketed in recent years.  This 
demand for clean energy could very well be the catalyst the renewable energy 
industry needs to push it beyond fossil fuels.  Unfortunately, public utility 
companies are not as nimble as private corporations would like them to be, 
and they have not always been able to respond to this increased demand.  As 
a result, multinational companies, like Apple and Google, are either generat-
ing their own energy or entering the energy market themselves.   
This shift could have a significant negative impact on the existing en-
ergy delivery system and a regulatory framework that is not equipped to deal 
with massive, multi-market companies entering the industry.  When Thomas 
Edison flipped the switch at his Pearl Street station on September 4, 1882, 
lighting 400 light bulbs,1 little could he have known that, one day, technology 
would advance so far to allow people to speak to each other from different 
parts of the planet.  The leaps and bounds made in technology over the last 
136 years are just that huge.  In the same way that Edison could not have 
imagined future technology, state and federal regulatory commissions could 
not have anticipated the rapidly emerging new technologies and societal de-
mands presented by multinational corporate entities.  This Article discusses 
                                                          
 1.  LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 291 (2015). 
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the corporate demand for clean power and recommends how the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and state public utility commissions 
can update their regulatory framework to better manage that demand. 
Part II of this Article explores the increasing corporate demand for clean 
energy and the emergence of private corporations, such as Apple and Google, 
onto the energy landscape.  In August 2016, Apple Energy LLC (“Apple En-
ergy”) received federal approval to sell wholesale electricity into the national 
grid.2  Prior to that, Google Energy received approval to do the same.3  Glob-
ally, we see more private businesses, especially Fortune 100 companies, gen-
erating their own electricity, investing in renewable energy facilities, and vol-
untarily purchasing renewable energy credits to cover their carbon footprint. 
While multiple reasons likely factored into the shift toward self-gener-
ation, one reason may be that utilities are unable to supply the amount of 
renewable energy now in demand, leaving corporations to come up with cre-
ative means to meet their corporate social responsibility goals and the market 
demands of millennials who are seeking sustainable products.  Regardless of 
the reasons, the energy delivery landscape will change significantly as more 
and more businesses self-generate.  This change can be positive, as it adds 
much needed renewable energy.  The concern, however, is the private dis-
ruption of what has historically been a highly regulated public service indus-
try, potentially resulting in a slippery slope of market power and a potential 
lack of consumer protection. 
As large multinational corporations, like Apple and Google, seek to sell 
electricity, FERC, the agency in charge of regulating wholesale energy sales, 
will need to implement more protective measures to ensure consumers are 
charged reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates for electricity and energy 
products.  Part III explains FERC’s current rule, which allows multinational 
corporations to use market-based rates in setting customer rates for electricity 
or energy products, so long as they do not own or control (that is, so long as 
they do not have market power) over a certain amount of electricity within 
any given region.  This is called the “horizontal market power rule.”  Further, 
Part III recommends FERC redefine market power to include market power 
in any industry, not just in industries regulated by FERC.4  FERC has the 
exclusive authority to regulate wholesale sales of electricity and an obligation 
to ensure that customers are protected and not manipulated by those sales.5  
                                                          
 2.  Aaron Pressman, Solar Power from Apple Could Light Up Your Home, FORTUNE (Aug. 4, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/04/apple-approval-solar-electricity/. 
 3.  See Candace Lombardi, Google Gets Go-Ahead to Buy, Sell Energy, CNET (Feb. 19, 2010, 
6:38 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/google-gets-go-ahead-to-buy-sell-energy/.  
 4.  FERC’s regulatory authority generally includes hydropower, wholesale electricity genera-
tion, liquified natural gas projects, and interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil.  See 
What FERC Does, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last updated Aug. 14, 2018). 
 5.  Id.  
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It may establish whatever rule is appropriate to effectuate this congressional 
mandate.  Recent case law affirms that in fulfilling its statutory obligations, 
FERC should also consider relevant factors that are outside of its regulatory 
control, such as whether the applicant holds market power in another industry 
it could use to manipulate and discriminate against energy customers.6 
Part IV discusses the stress corporate demand for, or independent devel-
opment of, clean energy places on existing retail regulatory frameworks.  If 
large corporate customers leave, utilities could be left with lost profits and 
stranded costs, which could then be filtered down to the remaining customers, 
resulting in higher utility bills for everyone.  However, this also provides an 
opportunity for regulators to change how utilities plan and collaborate with 
their customers, so that they can be responsive to clean energy demands. 
As the negative impacts of climate change accelerate around the globe,7 
the goal of decreasing reliance on fossil fuels is certainly an important one.  
Part V concludes that the corporate demand for clean energy could very well 
be the catalyst that propels clean energy into the spotlight.  Large multina-
tional corporations have the means and motive to ensure their products are 
offered through an environmentally friendly, clean energy manner.  This is 
the future with customers, shareholders, and investors demanding no less.  
The goal, however, is to do so in a way that protects the end consumer from 
unreasonable costs associated with either market manipulation or utility lost 
profits. 
II.  THE CORPORATE DEMAND FOR CLEAN ENERGY 
This Part analyzes the ever-increasing corporate demand for clean en-
ergy and some of the drivers for this demand, including consumer and inves-
tor expectations.8  This Part also discusses how this corporate demand is out-
pacing utility supply and how corporations are acting to generate their own 
renewable energy outside of the historical utility supply structure.9 
A.  Corporate Renewable Energy Goals and Incentives 
Influential global companies are increasingly demanding access to clean 
energy.  According to one report, 23% of new wind capacity in the United 
States is built for non-utility, private businesses.10  In 2015 alone, over 300 
                                                          
 6.  See Sierra Club v. FERC (Southeast Market Pipelines Project), 867 F.3d 1357, 1376 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017). 
 7.  See Alina Bradford & Stephanie Pappas, Effects of Global Warming, LIVE SCI. (Aug. 12, 
2017, 9:12 AM), https://www.livescience.com/37057-global-warming-effects.html.  
 8.  See infra Section II.A. 
 9.  See infra Section II.B. 
 10.  LeRoy C. Paddock & Max Greenblum, Community Benefit Agreements for Wind Farm 
Siting in Context, in SHARING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ENERGY AND RESOURCE ACTIVITY: 
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billion euros were globally invested in clean energy,11 and as of the writing 
of this Article, corporate buyers have purchased some 19 gigawatts (“GW”)12 
of renewable energy.13  While multiple reasons can contribute to this shift, 
observable trends are those within large multinational corporations that have 
established corporate social responsibility initiatives to meet consumer and 
investor expectations. 
Voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives14 appear to be play-
ing a big role in increasing private generation (and consumption) of renewa-
ble energy, with major companies seeing an economic advantage to taking 
on more leadership roles for climate control measures.  According to one 
study, 60% of Fortune 100 companies and 43% of Fortune 500 companies 
have some sort of green energy goals or initiatives.15  For example, Apple, 
Bloomberg, Coca-Cola Enterprises, Equinix, GM, Goldman Sachs, Google, 
H&M, HP Inc., IKEA, ING, Johnson&Johnson, Microsoft,16 Nestle, Nike, 
                                                          
LEGAL CHANGE AND IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 155, 156 (Lila Barrera-Hernández et al. eds., 2016) 
(citing Emily Williams, Top Trends for Wind Power in 2014, INTO THE WIND (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.aweablog.org/ten-top-trends-for-wind-power-in-2014/). 
 11.  Commission Proposes New Rules for Consumer Centred Clean Energy Transition, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N (Nov. 30, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-
new-rules-consumer-centred-clean-energy-transition.  
 12.  How much power is 1 gigawatt?  According to the U.S. Department of Energy, it is enough 
to power Doc’s DeLorean from Back to the Future or 100 million LED lights (light-emitting diodes) 
or 9,090 Nissan Leafs.  See  How Much Power Is 1 Gigawatt?, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & 
RENEWABLE ENERGY (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.energy.gov/eere/articles/how-much-power-1-
gigawatt. 
 13.  Angus McCrone, McCrone: Companies Buying Green Power–How Big a Trend?, 
BLOOMBERG NEF (Apr. 20, 2017), https://about.bnef.com/blog/companies-buying-green-power-
big-trend/. 
 14.  Corporate social responsibility can be defined in many ways, but the 3P business model 
encourages social responsibility initiatives that focus on “people, planet and profit.”  Arlette 
Measures, What Is a 3P Triple Bottom Line Company?, HOUS. CHRON, http://smallbusi-
ness.chron.com/3p-triple-bottom-line-company-4141.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 15.  WORLD WILDLIFE FOUND. ET AL., POWER FORWARD 2.0: HOW AMERICAN COMPANIES 
ARE SETTING CLEAN ENERGY TARGETS AND CAPTURING GREATER BUSINESS VALUE 9 (2014), 
https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/reports/2017-05/PowerForward2.0.pdf; see RE100, 
GROWING MARKET DEMAND FOR RENEWABLE POWER: RE100 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2016), 
http://media.virbcdn.com/files/f9/d6e716c56a9b3312-RE100AnnualReport2016_v17.pdf (“There 
are now an increasing number of companies, investors, cities and citizens that have set renewable 
power targets and this is driving change in the market place.  Electricity utilities and policymakers 
now need to consider the source of electricity that is wanted—not just the quantity, location or 
timing.”).   
 16.  Microsoft is also currently partnering with the University of Texas to research means for 
their data centers to become battery-powered.  Kristen Mosbrucker, Electricity Gap: Microsoft Taps 
UTSA, Energy Companies to Bridge Data-Center Divide, SAN ANTONIO BUS. J. (Aug. 12, 2016), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/news/2016/08/11/electricity-gap-microsoft-taps-utsa-en-
ergy.html. 
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Philips, SAP, Starbucks, TD Bank Group, UBS, and Walmart17 have volun-
tary corporate social responsibility initiatives committed to only using renew-
able electricity for business activities and increasing the demand and access 
to renewable energy around the globe.18 Many of these corporations have 
also joined RE100,19 a collaborative of businesses committed to a sustainable 
future through renewable electricity.20  While they each have varying goals, 
these companies all made commitments to become 100% renewable by a cer-
tain date.21  Some companies already reached the 100% renewable energy 
goal; however, the average RE100 company is only about 50% of the way 
there.  Average RE100 companies are projected to reach 80% by 2020.22 
Companies with corporate initiatives to consume their energy and elec-
tricity from renewable sources cite several reasons for this target, including: 
• To reduce their carbon footprint—in some cases, compa-
nies have specifically set science-based targets to map 
their greenhouse gas emissions reductions, and switching 
to renewable energy is part of that strategy[;] 
• To secure stable energy bills and mitigate fluctuating or 
uncertain medium to long-term energy costs[;] 
• To realize cost savings associated with generating power 
from renewables—particularly wind and solar[;] 
• To gain cost benefits of onsite combined heat and power 
plants—particularly where there is a low or no-cost waste 
or biomass feedstock[;23and] 
                                                          
 17.  See Companies, RE100, http://there100.org/companies (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 18.  RE100, supra note 15, at 2–4; see RE100, supra note 17.  
 19.  See RE100, supra note 17. 
 20.  RE100, supra note 15, at 2–3.  “The private sector accounts for around half of the world’s 
electricity consumption.  Switching this demand to renewables will accelerate the transformation of 
the global energy market and aid the transition to a low carbon economy.”  The World’s Most Influ-
ential Companies, Committed to 100% Renewable Power, RE100, http://there100.org/re100 (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 21.  RE100, supra note 15, at 4.  Companies are also looking to encourage their supply chain 
to incorporate renewable energy directives.  Id. at 6. 
 22.  Id. at 12–15.  Businesses from all sectors have shown an interest in renewable energy con-
sumption/generation; however, the information communications and technology sector is leading 
the way.  The businesses in this sector are nearly two-thirds of the way to meeting their goals.  Id. 
at 5.  For example, “Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft . . . have all built ultra-efficient data 
[centers] powered with renewable energy to green their images.”  Stephen Lacey, Why Big Data Is 
Going Green, CORP. KNIGHTS (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.corporateknights.com/channels/con-
nected-planet/why-big-data-is-going-green-13970577/.  This is not surprising given the significant 
amount of energy required for data centers and cloud computing, as well as their corporate brands 
promoting sustainability.  RE100, supra note 15, at 7. 
 23.  “A feedstock is defined as any renewable, biological material that can be used directly as 
a fuel, or converted to another form of fuel or energy product.  Biomass feedstocks are the plant and 
algal materials used to derive fuels like ethanol, butanol, biodiesel, and other hydrocarbon fuels.” 
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• To access a more reliable electricity supply in areas where 
there is no or intermittent grid electricity.24 
In addition to these reasons, however, studies show that a major driver 
for corporate renewable energy initiatives is customer and investor expecta-
tion.  An overwhelming percentage of customers (some 80%) believe corpo-
rations should engage in social initiatives and those initiatives would be fi-
nancially beneficial for the corporation.25  Multiple social science studies 
show a link between corporate social initiatives and positive consumer re-
sponse with improved financial performance.26  The most effective initia-
tives, however, are those that closely parallel the firm’s brand and image.27  
Customers expect corporations to engage in sincere social responsibility and 
will punish those perceived to be insincere, reactive, or acting only in their 
self-interest.28  Customers may also punish corporations who stay silent or 
fail to act when customers have an expectation (based on image and brand) 
that the corporation will act.29  This appears to be particularly true when it 
comes to millennials. 
According to a 2015 market study conducted by Morgan Stanley, mil-
lennials—and especially female millennials—care significantly more about 
sustainability than their predecessors.30  With a whopping 84% of the millen-
nial investors identifying sustainability as an important factor when making 
living and investment decisions,31 businesses like Apple and Google are tak-
ing notice.32  According to the report, millennials—as compared to the gen-
eral population—are: 
• Nearly three times more likely to seek employment with a 
company because of its stance on social and/or environ-
mental issues . . . [;] 
                                                          
Biomass Feedstocks, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www.en-
ergy.gov/eere/bioenergy/biomass-feedstocks#Top (last visited Aug. 21, 2018).  
 24.  RE100, supra note 15, at 4.  
 25.  Karen L. Becker-Olsen et al., The Impact of Perceived Corporate Social Responsibility on 
Consumer Behavior, 59 J. BUS. RES. 46, 52 (2006). 
 26.  Id. at 47 (citing numerous studies).  
 27.  Id. at 49. 
 28.  Id. at 46.  
 29.  Daniel Korschun, Staying Politically Neutral Is More Dangerous for Companies than You 
Think, CONVERSATION (Feb. 5, 2017, 11:56 PM), http://theconversation.com/staying-politically-
neutral-is-more-dangerous-for-companies-than-you-think-72252. 
 30.  MORGAN STANLEY INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE INVESTING, SUSTAINABLE SIGNALS: THE 
INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 1 (2015) [hereinafter MORGAN STANLEY], https://www.mor-
ganstanley.com/sustainableinvesting/pdf/Sustainable_Signals.pdf.  Interestingly, women investors 
are “substantially more likely” than men investors to care about sustainability when making invest-
ment decisions.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 4. 
 32.  Pressman, supra note 2; see Candace, supra note 3. 
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• Nearly twice as likely to purchase from a brand because of 
the company’s social and/or environmental impact . . . [;] 
• Nearly twice as likely to check product packaging to en-
sure sustainability . . . [;] 
• Nearly twice as likely to invest in companies or funds that 
target specific social or environmental outcomes . . . [;] 
• Nearly twice as likely to invest in companies or funds that 
aim to use environmental, social, or governance practices 
to create a value differentiator . . . [; and] 
• Over twice as likely to exit an investment position because 
of objectionable corporate activity . . . .33 
By 2020, one-third of the United States’ adult population will be com-
prised of millennials,34 who are projected to spend $1.4 trillion annually.35  
This is important when reconciled with another study that found, globally, 
nearly three in four millennials are willing to pay more for sustainable prod-
ucts and services.36  Millennials are looking for fresh organic ingredients, 
environmentally friendly services, and companies who share their commit-
ment to social values.37  They are image-conscious with their work and per-
sonal life, and they are willing to sacrifice or pay more to be associated with 
a company who represents their ideals.38  Furthermore, millennials are more 
electronically aware and connected than any previous generation.  They are 
heavy users of technology, portable devices, and social media and are greatly 
influenced by those interactions.39  Prudent companies, aware of these market 
preferences, will compete for their business and look to accommodate these 
consumer, investor, and work preferences.40  Electricity generation provides 
a good example of this shifting landscape.  One article title summed it up 
                                                          
 33.  MORGAN STANLEY, supra note 30, at 4. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  CHRISTOPHER DONNELLY & RENATO SCAFF, ACCENTURE, WHO ARE THE MILLENNIAL 
SHOPPERS? AND WHAT DO THEY REALLY WANT?, https://www.accenture.com/mz-en/insight-out-
look-who-are-millennial-shoppers-what-do-they-really-want-retail (last visited Sept. 15, 2018). 
 36.  Green Generation: Millennials Say Sustainability Is a Shopping Priority, NIELSEN (Nov. 
5, 2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/green-generation-millennials-say-sus-
tainability-is-a-shopping-priority.html.  
 37.  The Sustainability Imperative, NIELSEN (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/in-
sights/reports/2015/the-sustainability-imperative.html.  
 38.  CHRISTINE BARTON ET AL., BCG, HOW MILLENNIALS ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF 
MARKETING FOREVER (2014), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2014/marketing-center-con-
sumer-customer-insight-how-millennials-changing-marketing-forever.aspx.  
 39.  Id.  “Millennials identify with brands more personally and emotionally than do older gen-
erations.  Fifty percent of U.S. [m]illennials ages 18 to 24 and 38[%] of those ages 25 to 34 agree 
that brands ‘say something about who I am, my values, and where I fit in.’”  Id. 
 40.  MORGAN STANLEY, supra note 30, at 4 (“As [m]illennials begin to accumulate more 
wealth and invest accordingly, their perceptions of sustainability are likely to have a significant 
impact on the financial services sector.”).  
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quite well: “Millennials want solar, storage, shared energy—and an app for 
all that.”41 
B.  The Shift to Corporate Generation of Renewable Energy 
The challenge for corporations is finding a way to fulfill their renewable 
energy goals and satisfy consumer and investor expectations.  Their options 
include purchasing utility-scale renewable energy, purchasing renewable en-
ergy credits or certificates,42 entering into power purchase agreements 
(“PPAs”)43 for wind, solar, and hydropower, or installing their own renewa-
ble energy generating facilities (self-generation).44  As discussed in great de-
tail in Part IV, most companies prefer to purchase their renewable energy 
directly from their local utility company; however, utilities are unable to meet 
the increased demand.45  So, while corporations do not want to enter into 
PPAs or self-generate, “the lack of responsiveness from utilities in some re-
gions has forced them to do exactly this,” and unless the power sector can 
find “more proactive and creative solutions,” it may be the wave of the fu-
ture.46 
                                                          
 41.  Sophie Vorrath, Millennials Want Solar, Storage, Shared Energy—And an App for All 
That, ONE STEP OFF THE GRID (Aug. 17, 2016), https://onestepoffthegrid.com.au/millennials-want-
solar-storage-shared-energy-app/.  According to this study, millennials expect renewable energy 
consumption and an application to control their energy profiles that allows for sharing opportunities.  
Id.  Globally, over half of all millennials said they would invest in their own renewable energy, such 
as solar panels, in the next five years; and of them, 73% wanted to share any excess power with 
other consumers and 77% would use onsite battery storage.  Id.  This interest in battery energy 
storage is related to millennials’ desire to be portable.  Historically, home energy delivery manage-
ment was developed for homeowners.  Millennials, however, are less likely and less interested in 
owning homes.  Instead, they want to be in control of their energy consumption on an individual 
basis.  See Bruce Eric Anderson, Honeywell Introduces Home Energy Management Software for 
Utilities to Enhance Grid Stability, Help Homeowners Lower Energy Bills, HONEYWELL (Jan. 31, 
2017), https://www.honeywell.com/newsroom/pressreleases/2017/01/honeywell-introduces-home-
energy-management-software-for-utilities-to-enhance-grid-stability-help-homeowners-lower-en-
ergy-bills.   
 42.  One renewable energy credit (or certificate) generally represents 1 megawatt hour 
(“MWh”) of electricity generated by a renewable energy source.  See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 485–86.  While anyone can purchase a renewable energy credit (generally to offset the amount of 
energy consumed), renewable energy credits were historically used by a utility company to meet 
state renewable energy requirements, instead of actually generating the renewable energy itself.  See 
id. 
 43.  A PPA is a long-term financial agreement between two parties, one which generates elec-
tricity (the seller) and one which is looking to purchase electricity (the buyer) to assist in financing 
the energy project.  See Power Purchase Agreements, RENEWABLE CHOICE ENERGY, 
https://www.renewablechoice.com/services/power-purchase-agreements/ (last visited Aug. 21, 
2018).  
 44.  RE100, supra note 15, at 12–15.  
 45.  Id. at 7. 
 46.  Id. 
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Further, purchasing renewable energy credits has fallen out of favor be-
cause it does not guarantee that renewable energy is displacing fossil fuel 
energy, only that a credit is being purchased.  Forbes ran an article, in June 
2016, outlining Apple’s history and what may have played into its decision 
to join the energy business.47  According to the article, Apple was one of the 
first of the world’s largest companies to commit to 100% renewable energy.48  
Apple already claims 93% of its global energy consumption comes from re-
newable resources.49  One way Apple achieved 93% is by purchasing renew-
able energy credits or certificates.50  The article points out, however, “a com-
pany cannot claim to be 100% renewable while relying entirely on grid 
power,” especially in the United States where two-thirds of the grid is still 
powered by fossil fuels.51  Most companies dedicated to green energy see 
purchasing offsets as a short-term band-aid.  They see it as a bridge to meet 
their targets until they can implement more permanent solutions like PPAs 
and on-site renewable energy generation.52 
As a result, many companies have entered into PPAs with independent 
power producers to secure their renewable power.53  For example, Microsoft 
signed two PPAs for wind energy in Texas that generate up to 100 megawatts 
(“MW”) annually;54 and Adobe, which has a goal of 100% renewable energy 
                                                          
 47.  Tim Healy, Why Apple Energy is a Wake-Up Call for Businesses, FORBES (June 16, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2016/06/16/why-apple-energy-is-a-wake-up-call-for-
businesses/#6f799a4a3b7d.  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  APPLE, ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT: 2016 PROGRESS REPORT, COVERING 
FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 9 (2016), http://images.apple.com/environment/pdf/Apple_Environmen-
tal_Responsibility_Report_2016.pdf. 
 50.  Id. at 12.  Apple is not alone in this claim.  SAP (a German company) claims offset of its 
entire global energy use by purchasing renewable energy certificates.  Ucilia Wang, SAP Joins Tech 
Giants Google and Apple in Reaching for 100% Green Energy, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/sap-renewable-energy-credits-100-percent-
goal. 
 51.  Healy, supra note 47.  While Tim Healy, the article’s author and the CEO and chairman of 
EnerNOC, defended Apple’s (and others’) historical reliance on renewable energy credits, he dis-
cussed the implications of Apple’s move from purchaser to seller, which could be significant.  One 
potential implication is Apple will look to green up its supply chain by allowing its suppliers to 
utilize the on-site renewable energy.  Id.  The RE100 report signaled this move as well.  Companies 
are looking to encourage their supply chain to incorporate renewable energy directives.  RE100, 
supra note 15, at 6.  Absent a change in the current regulatory structure, however, companies are 
not allowed to sell retail electricity to their suppliers.  See THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES TRANSFORMING THE GRID EDGE, WORLD ECON. FORUM 5 (2017), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Electricity_2017.pdf.   
 52.  RE100, supra note 15, at 7. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  To put this into context, the average U.S. residential customer consumes approximately 10 
to 11 MW of electricity per year (note that 10 MW equals 10,000 kilowatts).  Frequently Asked 
Question—How Much Electricity Does an American Home Use?, U.S ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
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by 2035, is currently at 30% by using PPAs that feed into the grid.55  Nearly 
half of the RE100 member companies, however, are using some form of on-
site self-generation.56  For example, Infosys (an Indian company) installed 
solar panels on its campuses that currently generate approximately 3 MW of 
energy, with plans to install another 175 MW through on-site and off-site 
installations.57 
Apple and Google also self-generate significant amounts of renewable 
energy both on-site and off-site for their own consumption; however, these 
two multinational corporations have taken matters one step further and are 
now selling their self-generated electricity into the energy market.  On June 
6, 2016, Apple Energy filed an application with FERC to be a wholesale 
seller of electricity with market-based rates.58  It sought authority to sell elec-
tricity in the majority of the U.S. Power Pool Regions59 beginning in August 
2016.60  Apple Energy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the tech giant Apple 
Inc. (“Apple”).61  While Apple Energy does not own or control transmission 
facilities in any region, Apple owns several generation facilities throughout 
the United States, including 267 MW of solar photovoltaic panels, 18 MW 
                                                          
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3 (last updated Nov. 7, 2017); see Electricity Ex-
plained: Measuring Electricity, U.S ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyex-
plained/index.php?page=electricity_measuring (describing how electricity is measured) (last up-
dated Feb. 10, 2017).  
 55.  RE100, supra note 15, at 12. 
 56.  Id. at 12–15. 
 57.  Id. at 13. 
 58.  Application of Apple Energy LLC for Market-Based Rate Authority and Request for Waiv-
ers and Blanket Authorizations at 1, No. ER16-1887 (FERC June 6, 2016) [hereinafter Apple En-
ergy Application]. 
 59.  See Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N 
(FERC), https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp (last update Apr. 13, 
2017) (illustrating the U.S. Power Pool Regions).  
 60.  “Applicant seeks authority to sell power at wholesale in the Southeast, Southwest, North-
west, Northeast, Central, and Southwest Power Pool Regions.”  Apple Energy Application, supra 
note 58, at 1; see also Letter Order Granting Market-Based Rate Authorization at 1 n.1, No. ER16-
1887 (FERC Aug. 4, 2016) [hereinafter FERC Letter Order] (“Apple Energy requests authorization 
to sell ancillary services in the markets administered by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., New York 
Independent System Operator, Inc., ISO New England Inc., California Independent System Opera-
tor Corp. (CAISO), Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., and Southwest Power Pool, 
Inc.  Apple Energy also requests authorization to engage in the sale of certain ancillary services as 
a third-party provider in other markets.”); Electric Power Markets, supra note 59.  
 61.  Apple Energy Application, supra note 60, at 2.  
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of fuel cells, and 3.3 MW of hydropower.62  Multiple facilities went into ser-
vice in 2015 or 2016,63 with a total generating capacity of 288.7 MW in the 
United States.64  Globally, Apple has significantly more generation, includ-
ing 32 MW at their Singapore facilities that cover more than 800 rooftops65 
and 200 MW at their facilities in China66 to offset the energy use.  Based on 
the information provided by Apple Energy and a lack of opposition,67 FERC 
issued a final order68 granting the application on August 4, 2016.69  Apple 
Energy filed their tariff, and the entity may now sell wholesale power at mar-
ket-based rates. 
                                                          
 62. Apple owns several different generation facilities throughout the United States and abroad, 
including: 
• 67.5 MW solar photovoltaic and biogas generation facility in North Carolina; 
• 3 MW hydroelectric power facility in Oregon (45 Mile Hydroelectric Power 
Plant); 
• 0.3 MW hydroelectric power facility in Oregon (Monroe Drop Project); 
• 19.9 MW solar photovoltaic generating facility in Nevada (Ft. Churchill Solar 
Array) (Sierra Pacific Power Company controls and operates this facility, 
which is interconnected to the transmission system); 
• 50 MW solar photovoltaic generating facility in Arizona (Bonnybrooke PV) 
(this facility was still in construction at the time of Apple’s application, is ex-
pected to be up and running by the end of 2016, and will be interconnected to 
the transmission system); 
• 130 MW solar photovoltaic generating facility in California (California Flats 
Solar) (this facility was set to begin generation in October 2016, and is gov-
erned by a Power Purchase Agreement between Apple and California Flats 
Solar); 
• 18 MW behind the meter generating facilities (Apple Campus 2—PV and Ap-
ple Campus 2—Fuel Cell); 
• 32 MW solar rooftops in Singapore; and 
• 200 MW solar in China.  
See id. at 2–3. 
The first three facilities are qualifying facilities, exempt from certain requirements of the Fed-
eral Power Act. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.601 (2018).  The remaining generation facilities make up 19.9 
MW of generation in the Northwest region and 198 MW in the Southwest region.  See Apple Energy 
Application, supra note 58, at 2–3.  
 63. Apple Energy Application, supra note 58, at 16–17. 
 64.  See id. at 2–3.  The 288.7 MW capacity is less than the 500 MW limit FERC places on 
wholesale sellers wishing to use market-based rates.  18 C.F.R. § 35.36(a)(2) (2018). 
 65.  Press Release, Apple, Apple Now Globally Powered by 100 Percent Renewable Energy 
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/04/apple-now-globally-powered-by-100-
percent-renewable-energy/. 
 66.  Philip Elmer-Dewitt, How Big Is Apple’s Green Initiative in China?, FORTUNE (Oct. 22, 
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/22/apple-china-solar/. 
 67.  The Public Utilities Commission of Nevada filed a timely notice of intervention but did 
not make any additional filings in opposition to Apple Energy’s application.  Notice of Intervention 
of the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada, No. ER16-1887 (FERC June 22, 2016).  No other 
interested stakeholders sought to intervene. 
 68. FERC Letter Order, supra note 59, at 5. 
 69.  Id.  
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Several years earlier, Google Energy LLC (“Google Energy”),70 a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Google, Inc. (“Google”), became a wholesale 
seller of electricity.71  At the time of its application, Google did not own any 
transmission lines or have market power of any kind because it did not own 
any generation facilities in North America.72  It did, however, request author-
ization to be a wholesale seller (at market rates) to multiple U.S. regions.73  
It appears Google’s only change in status is it now controls 114 MW of en-
ergy generation capacity from a wind farm in Iowa pursuant to a PPA with 
Garden Wind.74 
As discussed in Parts III and IV, this shift from utility-based to corpo-
rate-based energy generation is disrupting the historical regulatory model for 
electricity generation and sales.  While this can be seen as a positive change 
because it results in an influx of clean energy, this private corporate displace-
ment of what has historically been a highly regulated public utility service 
industry could result, among other things, in a slippery slope of corporate 
market power and lack of consumer protection. 
III.  THE CURRENT WHOLESALE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS NOT 
EQUIPPED TO ADDRESS CORPORATE “UTILITIES” 
As Apple and Google move into the wholesale electricity market, one 
cannot help but consider what this could mean for the future of energy deliv-
ery in the United States.  This Part looks at the current regulatory framework 
and considers the areas in which it may not be adequate to govern situations 
where multinational corporations are becoming bigger players.75 This Part 
then suggests FERC should change its test for market power to address the 
potential slippery slope early.76 
                                                          
 70.  According to the company, Google Energy “was formed to identify and develop opportu-
nities to contain and manage the cost of energy for Google.” Application of Google Energy LLC 
for Market Based Rate Authority and Granting of Waivers and Blanket Authorizations at 2, No. 
ER10-468 (FERC Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Google Energy Application].  
 71.  Order Granting Market-Based Rate Authorization at 2, No. ER10-468 (FERC Feb. 18, 
2010) [hereinafter Google Energy Order].  
 72. Google Energy Application, supra note 70, at 4.  
 73.  Id. at attach. A.  Google requested approval to sell in regions served by PJM Interconnec-
tion, New York ISO, New England ISO, California ISO, Midwest ISO, and third parties.  Id.  
 74.  Notice of Change in Status, Google Energy LLC, No. ER10-468 (FERC Aug. 13, 2010).  
In the notice, Google Energy also acknowledged that it “indirectly holds a 20.5% non-managing 
interest in Peace Garden Wind, LLC,” which owns and operates 169.5 MW of wind generation.  Id. 
at 2 n.5. 
 75.  See infra Section III.A. 
 76.  See infra Section III.B. 
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A.  The FERC’s Authority over Wholesale Sales of Electricity 
FERC has authority to regulate, among other things, entities engaged in 
the wholesale generation of electricity and interstate electricity transmis-
sion.77  Wholesale generation refers to the sale of electricity to another en-
tity—usually a utility company—that then distributes the electricity to the 
end consumer (the retail sale).78  The Federal Rules require anyone seeking 
to become a seller of wholesale power to apply through FERC.79 
Historically, all entities seeking to sell electricity at wholesale were re-
quired to submit cost-of-service rate cases for FERC approval.  Meaning, 
wholesale sellers were required to show their actual costs of service, which 
FERC allowed them to recover from the customer, plus a reasonable rate of 
return.80  The utility had the burden to show their investments were prudent 
and resulted in a benefit to the customer.81  As the United States moved to-
ward deregulation of the electricity industry, FERC began reviewing pro-
posals from wholesale power suppliers to use market-based rates—at least on 
a case-by-case basis.82  Market-based rates are intended to be set by a com-
petitive market without industry manipulation.83  “Regulation of market-
based rates thus focuses not on the costs that firms have actually incurred, 
but rather, on the firm’s share of ownership in the market.”84 
FERC’s original test to determine whether a wholesale seller qualified 
for market-based rates was a four-pronged analysis: 
(1) whether the seller and its affiliates lack, or have adequately mit-
igated, market power in generation; (2) whether the seller and its 
affiliates lack, or have adequately mitigated, market power in 
transmission; (3) whether the seller or its affiliates can erect other 
barriers to entry; and (4) whether there is evidence involving the 
seller or its affiliates that relates to affiliate abuse or reciprocal 
dealing.85 
                                                          
 77.  16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).  
 78.  Id. § 824(d).  “Sale of electric energy at wholesale” is defined as “a sale of electric energy 
to any person for resale.”  Id. 
 79.  18 C.F.R. § 35.36(a)(1) (2018) (“Seller means any person that has authorization to or seeks 
authorization to engage in sales for resale of electric energy, capacity or ancillary services at market-
based rates under [S]ection 205 of the Federal Power Act.”). 
 80.  DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 368–71, 398–99. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Ser-
vices by Public Utilities, 119 FERC ¶ 61,295, 18 C.F.R. Pt. 35, at 5–6 (June 21, 2007) [hereinafter 
FERC Order No. 697], https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2007/062107/E-1.pdf.  
 83.  DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 399. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  FERC Order No. 697, supra note 82, at 5–6. 
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In 2004, FERC began modifying this test and ultimately ended up 
streamlining it into the current three-prong test, which requires FERC to de-
termine whether the applicant has: (1) horizontal market power;86 (2) vertical 
market power;87 or (3) affiliate88 abuse/preference.89  In Order 697, FERC 
explained that this new test would “help customers by ensuring that they are 
protected from the exercise of market power and would also provide greater 
certainty to sellers seeking market-based rate authority.”90 
In practice, FERC generally focuses on the first prong, assuming the last 
two prongs are met91 through transmission unbundling92 and regulatory re-
structuring.93  The first prong simply looks at whether the applicant is “a 
wholesale power marketer that controls or is affiliated with 500 MW or less 
of generation in aggregate per region or a wholesale power producer that 
owns, controls or is affiliated with 500 MW or less of generation in aggregate 
in the same region as its generation assets.”94 
The Code of Federal Regulations divides wholesale sellers into two cat-
egories—Category 1 and Category 2.  The distinction lies in the amount of 
market power and vertical utility control an applicant has.  If the applicant 
qualifies as a Category 1 seller, it may sell its electricity at market-based rates 
                                                          
 86.  Horizontal market power refers to the amount of control a company has over market prices.  
See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 413. 
 87.  Vertical market power refers to the amount of control a company has over upstream or 
downstream markets.  See id. 
 88.  Affiliate abuse/preference refers to the ability of a company to gain preferential treatment 
(and rates) from its affiliates so that the company pays less for the product than does its competitors.  
See id. at 413–14. 
 89.  FERC Order No. 697, supra note 82, at 6. 
The Commission initiated the instant rulemaking proceeding in April 2004 to consider 
‘the adequacy of the current analysis and whether and how it should be modified to assure 
that prices for electric power being sold under market-based rates are just and reasonable 
under the Federal Power Act.’  
Id. (quoting Market-Based Rates for Public Utilities, 107 FERC ¶ 61,019 at 1 (2004)).  
 90.  Id. at 7. 
 91.  DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 414. 
 92.  See Order No. 888, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter FERC Order 888], 
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm95-8-00w.txt.  Historically, utilities were ver-
tically integrated, meaning they owned all of the energy and energy systems so they could generate 
energy, transport it on their private transmission lines, and distribute it to the end consumer without 
ever involving another entity.  Unbundling refers to FERC’s requirement that utilities provide sep-
arate tariffs for transmission services and offer open access of transmission facilities to other energy 
providers at non-discriminatory rates.  See generally Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 
373 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (discussing how the unbundling of transmission services functions). 
 93.  See 18 C.F.R. § 35.39(a) (2018) (“As a condition of obtaining and retaining market-based 
rate authority, the conditions provided in this [S]ection, including the restriction on affiliate sales of 
electric energy and all other affiliate provisions, must be satisfied on an ongoing basis, unless oth-
erwise authorized by Commission rule or order.  Failure to satisfy these conditions will constitute a 
violation of the Seller’s market-based rate tariff.”). 
 94.  Id. § 35.36(a)(2)(i). 
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instead of requiring cost-of-service ratemaking.95  To qualify for Category 1 
status, the applicant must not have market power.  It must not own—or be 
affiliated with96—more than 500 MW of power generation within any certain 
region.  In addition, the applicant must not own, operate, or control transmis-
sion facilities or be affiliated with anyone who does.97  These requirements 
are ongoing and not just applicable at the time of filing.98  A seller must report 
any change in status to the FERC within thirty days.99 
In contrast, a Category 2 Seller is one that does not fit within the param-
eters of Category 1, meaning the applicant either owns greater than 500 MW 
                                                          
 95.  Frequently Asked Questions: Market-Based Rates, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/re-
sources/faqs/mbr-faqs.asp (last updated Mar. 21, 2018).  “Cost-of-service rates try to replicate the 
outcome a competitive market would produce, by examining utilities’ costs, whether those costs 
were prudently accrued, how they benefit customers, and then allowing the company to earn a ‘rea-
sonable’ return on its investment.”  DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 398. 
 96.  Affiliate of a specified company means: 
(i) Any person that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 10 
percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the specified company; 
(ii) Any company 10 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are owned, 
controlled, or held with power to vote, directly or indirectly, by the specified company; 
(iii) Any person or class of persons that the Commission determines, after appropriate 
notice and opportunity for hearing, to stand in such relation to the specified company that 
there is liable to be an absence of arm’s-length bargaining in transactions between them 
as to make it necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors or consumers that the person be treated as an affiliate; and 
(iv) Any person that is under common control with the specified company. 
(v) For purposes of paragraph (a)(9), owning, controlling or holding with power to vote, 
less than 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of a specified company creates a 
rebuttable presumption of lack of control. 
18 C.F.R. § 35.36(a)(9) (2018). 
 97.  The Code of Federal Regulations defines a Category 1 Seller as a Seller that: 
(i) Is either a wholesale power marketer that controls or is affiliated with 500 MW or less 
of generation in aggregate per region or a wholesale power producer that owns, controls 
or is affiliated with 500 MW or less of generation in aggregate in the same region as its 
generation assets; 
(ii) Does not own, operate or control transmission facilities other than limited equipment 
necessary to connect individual generating facilities to the transmission grid . . . ; 
(iii) Is not affiliated with anyone that owns, operates or controls transmission facilities in 
the same region as the Seller’s generation assets; 
(iv) Is not affiliated with a franchised public utility in the same region as the Seller’s 
generation assets; and 
(v) Does not raise other vertical market power issues. 
Id. § 35.36(a)(2). 
 98.  Id. § 35.39(a). 
 99.  Id. § 35.42(a)–(b).  The change in status includes a change in affiliation as well as a change 
in ownership or control resulting in an increase of 100 MW or more of generation.  Id. § 35.42(a)(1).  
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of generation in one region; owns, operates, or controls transmission facili-
ties; has market power; or is a franchised public utility.100  Category 2 appli-
cants undergo greater ratemaking scrutiny and have an increased regulatory 
burden, including higher reporting requirements after their status is approved, 
because Category 2 applicants, by their nature, are monopolies with market 
power within certain power regions.101 
B.  The Slippery Slope and Opportunities to Address It Early 
When Google Energy sought to become a Category 1 Seller,102 the only 
intervenors were the California Public Utilities Commission, which filed a 
motion to intervene four days after the deadline,103 and Mabuhay Alliance.104  
Mabuhay’s letter is interesting because it mimics some of the concerns dis-
cussed in this Article.  Specifically, it expressed “concerns about the impact 
of the filing on Asian American and other minority communities.”105  The 
letter was written on behalf of five million Asian Americans living in Cali-
fornia who worried about future energy rates if Google entered the energy 
market.106  The letter seemed to recognize the potential for a slippery slope,107 
stating that if FERC allowed Google to sell electricity, it may soon “dominate 
                                                          
 100.  Id. § 35.36(a)(3).  
 101.  See generally Id. § 35.36. Category 2 Sellers have two choices for determining rates.  They 
can prepare a mitigation proposal for FERC’s approval, or they can rely on a traditional cost-of-
service rate analysis: 
Default mitigation for sales of energy or capacity consists of three distinct products: (1) 
Sales of power of one week or less priced at the Seller’s incremental cost plus a 10 percent 
adder; (2) Sales of power of more than one week but less than one year priced at no higher 
than a cost-based ceiling reflecting the costs of the unit(s) expected to provide the service; 
and (3) New contracts filed for review under [FPA] [S]ection 205 . . . for sales of power 
for one year or more priced at a rate not to exceed embedded cost of service.  
Id. § 35.38(b). 
 102.  See Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 1.  
 103.  Id. at 2. 
 104.  Id. at 2 n.5; see Letter from Mabuhay Alliance, Google’s Application to Tap Power Mar-
kets and Its Potential Adverse Impact on California’s Ratepayers, No. ER10-468 (FERC Jan. 13, 
2010) [hereinafter Letter from Mabuhay Alliance].  FERC disregarded the letter, stating that 
Mabuhay Alliance provided “no facts or evidence that Google Energy has market power in Com-
mission-regulated markets.” Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 2 n.5.   
 105.  Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 2 n.5; see Letter from Mabuhay Alliance, supra 
note 104 and accompanying text. 
 106.  Letter from Mabuhay Alliance, supra note 104, at 1.  
 107.  “This case could be a precedent for other companies breaking away from the energy market 
grid in ways that could increase the cost to consumers including the newly unemployed and our 
nation’s 25 million small businesses that have no other options than the regulated utility monopoly.”  
Id. at 2 (citing Rebecca Smith & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Google Seeks to Tap Power Markets, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052748704854904574644721659940760).  
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the market in unexpected ways.”108  FERC found no basis for Mabuhay Al-
liance’s assertions.109 
Under FERC’s current rule, multinational corporations, like Apple and 
Google, are allowed to use market-based rates and given a lot of leeway in 
setting customer rates for electricity or energy products, so long as they do 
not own or control more than a certain amount of electricity within any given 
region.  This is called the “horizontal market power rule.”  The rule was in-
tended to promote competition and entry into the market by small utilities 
and independent power producers.110  Large utilities holding horizontal mar-
ket power do not qualify, but instead are subject to more stringent regulation 
by FERC to ensure their rates are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. 
While FERC’s market power test may be sufficient to protect customers 
from market rates set by small utilities and independent power producers, it 
may not be sufficient protection when the entity selling the electricity is a 
multinational billion-dollar corporation that already has market power in its 
own industry.  Safeguarding consumer protections will be key.  Mabuhay 
Alliance was likely thinking ahead when it protested Google’s entry into the 
energy market.111  FERC disregarded the letter, stating that Mabuhay Alli-
ance provided “no facts or evidence that Google Energy has market power in 
Commission-regulated markets.”112  Instead of focusing on commission-reg-
ulated markets, FERC should consider whether the applicant has market 
power in any industry, and whether that market power could result in con-
sumer manipulation or an abuse of power. 
Large tech companies selling electricity represent a concerning trend—
similar to Amazon’s bid to buy Whole Foods.  Amazon started out as an 
online bookseller in 1994 and is now one of the world’s largest corporations 
dominating the entire online retail market.113  According to a Reuters report, 
“Antitrust experts . . . said the [purchase of Whole Foods] will be approved 
                                                          
 108. Id. at 1. 
 109.  Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 2 n.5. 
 110.  See generally OFFICE OF ECON., ELEC. & NAT. GAS ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
HORIZONAL MARKET POWER IN RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2000), http://www.en-
ergymarketers.com/Documents/DOE_Horizontal_MP-0308.pdf.  
 111.  See Letter from Mabuhay Alliance, supra note 104, at 2 (“Asian American’s [sic] strongly 
favor competition and free markets as long as they are effectively regulated and scrutinized but, 
competition should be for the benefit of, not at the expense of, underserved communities or rate-
payers.  We also believe that many regulated utilities, such as PG&E and Sempra, more effectively 
serve our nation’s 15 million Asian American [sic] than most Silicon Valley companies such as 
Google.  This service includes non-discriminatory contracts with Asian American small businesses, 
a wide variety of Asian Americans in all levels of senior management, and investing in the growth 
and welfare of underserved Asian American communities including those long ignored by corporate 
America such as the Hmong, Laotian, Cambodian and Samoan communities.”).  
 112.  Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 2 n.5 (emphasis added). 
 113.  Relentless.com, ECONOMIST (June 19, 2014), https://www.economist.com/brief-
ing/2014/06/19/relentlesscom.  
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because Amazon sells few groceries and Whole Foods is a minnow in the 
grocery market.”114  But, this is exactly how large corporations leverage 
power from one market to enter another, ultimately dominating that indus-
try.115  Professor Darren Bush, an anti-trust expert, noted that one major con-
cern is the ability of large corporations to discriminate.116  He pointed to Am-
azon’s removal of the “buy” button from certain books published by entities 
embroiled in legal disputes with the corporation.117  This type of move from 
one large industry to another, especially when that industry is providing a 
public good, should at the very least raise consumer protection awareness. 
Since the early days of electricity,118 the United States has maintained 
the policy that energy is a “public good.”119  A public good is a commodity 
that individuals may consume but not prevent others from accessing.120  Clas-
sic examples of public goods include: public defense systems, such as police 
and fire services, public water, or air.121  Pure public goods have two primary 
characteristics: non-excludability and non-rivalrous consumption.122  Non-
excludability refers to the prohibition against excluding nonpayers from en-
joying the benefits of the good or service.123  This characteristic leads to the 
“free rider problem,” which occurs when a good is made available, and those 
who have not paid for it are still able to consume it.124  Non-rivalrous con-
sumption means consumption by one user of a good does not restrict con-
sumption by others.125  Because of these two characteristics, public goods 
cannot be supplied at a profit and may be abandoned by the private sector.126  
                                                          
 114.  Diane Bartz, Critics Say Whole Foods Deal Would Give Amazon an Unfair Advantage, 
REUTERS (June 22, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-whole-foods-m-a-amazon-com-anti-
trust-idUSKBN19D2Q8.  
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id.  According to one anonymous former republican antitrust enforcer, “The notion of lev-
eraging your power in market A to enter into market B has . . . been around for a long time as a 
basis for enforcement.”  Id. 
 118.  The “early days” began in 1882 with Thomas Edison’s Pearl Street station in Manhattan 
and the formation of the first electric holding company, Commonwealth Edison, in Chicago, Illinois.  
See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 291. 
 119.  See Christopher A. Simon, Is Energy a Public Good?, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (July 
2, 2007), https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2007/07/is-energy-a-public-good-
49201.html.  
 120.  Rafael Leal-Arcas, Sustainability, Common Concern, and Public Goods, 49 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 801, 807 (2017). 
 121.  See id.; Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, LIBRARY ECON. & LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
 122.  Leal-Arcas, supra note 120, at 807. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  See id. at 807–08.  
 125.  Inge Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).  
 126.  See Leal-Arcas, supra note 120, at 808. 
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As a result, governments typically provide pure public goods, such as a na-
tional defense system or traffic lights.127 
Impure public goods may occur when a good or service is not wholly 
non-excludable or non-rivalrous.128  There are two types of impure public 
goods: club goods and common pool resources.129  Club goods encompass 
those public goods that are non-rivalrous in consumption but excludable.130  
Common pool resources are those goods that are mostly non-excludable but 
rivalrous in consumption.131 
Energy by itself is a pure public good.  The law of conservation of en-
ergy tells us energy can neither be created nor destroyed.132  As such, energy 
is non-rivalrous in consumption and non-excludable.  Electricity, however, 
does not readily meet the economic classification of a public good.  Unlike 
energy, electricity is a secondary system because it is produced from the com-
bustion of primary energy sources: coal, oil, and natural gas.133  Because of 
this distinction, electricity is technically excludable and rivalrous in con-
sumption. 
Despite this classification, the United States still treats electricity as a 
public good.  This treatment may arise from ethics rather than economics.  
People in the United States rely on electricity to live their everyday lives, and 
it is not hyperbole to state that people would die without it.  An alternative 
view is that the secure supply of electricity rather than the electricity itself 
serves as the public good.134  For example, the open network of transmission 
lines used to transport electricity from the generator to the consumer are non-
excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption.  Because electricity is fungi-
ble, it is impossible to exclude people from only consuming electricity not 
transported via transmission line.  As a result, the secure supply of electricity 
provided by transmission lines is non-excludable.  In addition, because use 
                                                          
 127.  Id. at 807–08. 
 128.  See Kaul et al., supra note 125, at 4.  Because impure public goods are far more common 
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 129.  Id. at 5.  
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 134.  See generally Malcolm Abbott, Is the Security of Electricity Supply a Public Good?, 14 
ELECTRICITY J. 31, 32 (2001). 
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of the transmission lines once they are built does not deplete their ability to 
provide electricity, the security they provide is also non-rivalrous. 
Regardless of the reason for its treatment as a public good, electricity—
particularly the wholesale electricity market—is vulnerable to abuse because 
of the tendency of electric utilities to form natural monopolies.  “A natural 
monopoly exists when a single firm can produce a desired level of output at 
lower total cost than any output combination of more than one firm.”135  Elec-
tric utilities benefit from economies of scale, meaning that average cost of 
generating and transmitting electricity falls as the volume of consumers in-
creases.136  Once the infrastructure is built, it is far cheaper for a single utility 
company to provide electricity to a new customer than it is for a new utility 
to build its own infrastructure and then provide service.137  Due to these qual-
ities, electric utilities were initially vertically integrated, allowing a single 
company to monopolize the market and requiring greater regulation.138 
The slippery slope concern emerges when the tech companies are al-
lowed to leverage their market power from the information technology in-
dustry—with their ability to touch and control millions of customers—to now 
provide a common good such as electricity.  Several news articles discuss 
this concern,139 with the majority predicting that Apple will be able to sell 
electricity directly to end users, thereby replacing the traditional utility com-
pany.140  While this is something to keep an eye on, under current regulations, 
Apple is only allowed to consume the power itself or to sell it at wholesale.  
Another option, however, is more intriguing.  One author wrote, “Apple 
could sell clean energy to households, powering iPhones and perhaps electric 
vehicles with 100% renewable energy.”141  Again, the existing legal structure 
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does not allow Apple to sell electricity to households via transmission infra-
structure because that would result in a retail sale that Apple would need to 
be licensed as a state public utility to make.  Apple could, however, use its 
renewable energy facilities to charge batteries that could be sold to house-
holds to power their homes, iPhones, and electric cars.142 
We have seen examples of companies abusing their power when left 
unregulated before (for example, Enron).143  This abuse of power generally 
arises in one of three scenarios: (1) price-gouging, (2) undercutting, and (3) 
affiliate preference.  Price-gouging occurs when a seller spikes prices to a 
level above what is reasonable. 144  In this scenario, the corporate wholesale 
energy seller raises prices, resulting in increased retail costs that are passed 
down to the end consumer. 
Undercutting occurs when the seller offers energy at a price lower than 
what other companies could sell it at.145  Undercutting prices drives out com-
petition and allows the seller to increase its prices once the competition has 
been defeated.  Given the market power of multinational corporations, they 
would be able to absorb costs of selling electricity at a price lower than their 
competitors.  They have strong alternative markets and would survive the 
lower prices, while their competition would likely fail. 
In Nebbia v. New York,146 the Supreme Court identified one example of 
the perils of undercutting.147  In this popular constitutional law case, the Court 
upheld a fixed price for milk set by New York’s Milk Control Board.148  The 
Court’s reasoning rested on the need for expensive safeguards in the handling 
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 147.  See generally id. 
 148.  Id. at 520–21. 
  
2018] 1-CLICK ENERGY 95 
 
and production of milk to protect it from contamination.149  If there were no 
fixed price, milk producers could undercut each other by using less safe-
guards to achieve a lower price and, therefore, higher sales.150  Just as in 
Nebbia, Apple or Amazon could undercut other wholesale electricity compa-
nies in order to increase sales. 
Finally, multinational corporations could abuse their power by forcing 
consumers to subsidize energy for their affiliates.  The entities could allow 
affiliates to purchase wholesale energy at a price below market value and 
charge non-affiliates a higher price in order to make up the difference.  This 
same tactic was used by John D. Rockefeller and the railroads to subsidize 
shipping costs for oil.  Railroads charged Rockefeller a lower price and forced 
other oil producers to pay a higher price in response.151 
FERC could potentially address the unregulated power of multinational 
corporations by redefining market power to include market power in any in-
dustry, regardless of whether it is a FERC-regulated industry.  FERC has the 
exclusive authority to regulate wholesale sales of electricity and an obligation 
to ensure customers are protected from manipulation.  It may establish what-
ever rule is appropriate in order to carry out its statutory directives.  In doing 
so, FERC should consider all relevant factors, such as whether the applicant 
holds market power in another industry that could allow it to manipulate the 
energy industry and its consumers. 
The United States has historically sought to mitigate potential abuse of 
monopolist power through both regulation and fostering competition within 
the wholesale electricity market.  Alongside this action has been the public 
policy of protecting consumer access to electricity, which is evident in both 
judicial and legislative history.  The judiciary has long identified energy as a 
valid public use for purposes of eminent domain.152  Likewise, Congress 
stepped in early to protect consumers from corporate abuse in the electricity 
industry with the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
(“PUHCA”).153  The PUHCA was enacted when only three massive holding 
companies controlled nearly half the utilities in the United States.154  This 
pyramid scheme allowed holding companies to inflate and hide actual costs 
                                                          
 149.  Id. at 516–17. 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, & POWER 21–23 (2009). 
 152.  United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cty., 547 F.3d 943, 952 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 153.  Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (repealed 2005).  For an interesting historical dis-
cussion of the PUHCA, see A. C. Pritchard & Richard B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New 
Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841, 862–68 (2009).  
 154.  Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 153, at 847; Public Utility Holding Company Act 
(PUHCA), UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-en-
ergy-solutions/strengthen-policy/public-utility-holding.html#.W92y6S2ZMW9 (last visited Nov. 3, 
2018).  
  
96 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:73 
 
of service charged by unregulated affiliates, pass those costs down to the util-
ity, and to the end customer thereafter.155  Many argue this pyramid scheme 
led to the great Wall Street Crash of 1929.156  The PUHCA prohibited non-
utility owners (like oil companies) to own utilities and required the Securities 
and Exchange Commission to approve any utility merger or acquisition by a 
holding company.157  The PUHCA also required holding companies to incor-
porate in the state where the utility operated, so the state could regulate the 
utility.158  Congress’s protection continued over the years, but in 2005 it re-
pealed and replaced PUHCA with the Energy Policy Act of 2005.159 
Further, FERC previously noted the need to be adaptive to changing 
realities in the energy industry.  For example, in 1996, FERC issued Order 
888 that required utilities to provide open access to transmission facilities.160  
This order lessened the economies of scale,161 which enabled electricity util-
ities to form natural monopolies.  In any event, Congress tasked FERC with 
regulating wholesale electricity sales to ensure fair prices for consumers and 
returns on investment for utility shareholders.162 
Generally, “[a]n agency has no obligation to gather or consider . . . in-
formation if it has no statutory authority to act on that information.”163  And 
if an agency bases a decision on that information, “which Congress has not 
intended it to consider,” it can be found to have acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously.164  FERC’s authority to regulate entities engaged in the wholesale 
generation of energy is absolute, however, and not limited in the factors that 
it may consider.165  This is similar to its absolute congressional power to in-
clude all relevant factors when issuing permits for natural gas pipelines, 
which was recently at issue in Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (Southeast Market Pipelines Project).166 
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In Southeast Market Pipelines Project, the Sierra Club brought suit 
against FERC, alleging it failed to adequately consider the climate and com-
munity impacts of a proposed natural gas pipeline project running through 
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida.167  Environmental groups were concerned 
that the project would increase fossil fuel emissions that contribute to climate 
change, landowners did not want their land taken for a pipeline, and under-
privileged communities were concerned that the pipeline project would be 
constructed in neighborhoods already significantly burdened by pollution 
from industry.168  Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938,169 applicants wishing 
to construct a natural gas pipeline must first obtain approval from FERC—in 
the form of a certificate of public convenience and necessity.170  Prior to is-
suing the certificate, FERC is obligated to prepare an environmental impact 
statement (“EIS”) for actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”171  FERC did so and ultimately approved the pipeline’s certif-
icate without consideration of the climate and community impacts.172 
With regard to the climate impact, the pipelines relied on an earlier set 
of cases173 and argued that FERC had no obligation to look at these issues 
because it had no “legal power to prevent” the negative effect.174  The court 
disagreed and distinguished the cases.  In Sierra Club v. FERC (Freeport),175 
the court held that FERC had no legal authority to consider the climate im-
pacts of liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) exports when issuing an upgrade li-
cense and, therefore, was not obligated to include a climate assessment within 
the EIS.176  In the case at hand, the court distinguished Freeport by pointing 
out that FERC’s authority to issue permits in LNG matters is not congres-
sional.  Its authority derives from a “narrow delegation from the Department 
of Energy.”177  As a result, FERC is limited to the specific language of the 
delegated authority for LNG permits.178  It is not limited, however, when 
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Congress so broadly construed its authority as it did under the Natural Gas 
Act179 or, here, under the Federal Power Act.180 
FERC’s exclusive authority to regulate entities engaged in the whole-
sale generation of energy is an absolute right under the Federal Power Act.181  
It has the authority and the obligation to evaluate the market power of its 
applicants, regardless of whether that market power is within a commission-
regulated market, if that market power has the potential to negatively impact 
millions of customers.  Once again, FERC must adjust to changing times and 
redefine its market power definition to include market power in any industry, 
regardless of whether it is a FERC-regulated industry. 
FERC historically adapted to changing realities in the energy industry, 
and it can do so again.182  FERC is obligated under the Federal Power Act to 
protect the public from unreasonable rates and discriminatory practices.183  It 
should now take a more proactive role in regulating energy sales by multina-
tional companies that have the ability to reach millions with one click.184 
IV.  THE CURRENT RETAIL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS NOT NIMBLE 
ENOUGH TO MEET CORPORATE DEMAND FOR CLEAN ENERGY 
Another issue to address early is the corporate demand for, and corpo-
rate development of, clean energy and its stress on the current utility struc-
ture.  As previously noted, most corporate businesses do not want to become 
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energy providers, but “the lack of responsiveness from utilities in some re-
gions has forced them to do exactly this.”185  This lack of responsiveness to 
supply the clean energy in demand could very well result in significant lost 
profits, stranded costs for the utilities, and an increase in utility costs for re-
maining customers.  This Part looks at potential implications for incumbent 
utilities due to existing state regulatory schemes186 and considers opportuni-
ties for higher levels of collaboration for public-private development of clean 
energy.187 
A.  State Authority Over (Retail) Utility Planning 
Most public utilities are regulated by state public utility commissions 
that set prices for retail customer rates and regulate utility capital expenditure 
decisions through prudency-type hearings.188  Most states include some level 
of integrated resource planning (“IRP”).189  IRP requirements came into play 
in the late 1980s as states were looking for ways to respond to nuclear devel-
opment failures and the oil embargo.190 
These state requirements can vary widely, with most requiring utilities 
to consider long-term, least-cost, and lowest-risk methods for addressing (1) 
customer growth, (2) demand, (3) generation capability, and (4) availability 
of emergency backup if a plant fails.191  IRP standards tend to require utilities 
to have a holistic view of how demand can be met, and they do not generally 
focus on specific customers, such as corporate customers, demanding a spe-
cific type of energy.192 
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As such, most energy customers historically had little involvement in 
generation planning.  Instead, state public utility commissions required utili-
ties to make prudency determinations as to how much energy was needed and 
to forecast future energy demand.193  Traditionally, prudency reviews did not 
involve what type of energy to develop, other than as it related to projected 
cost.  If utilities could generate enough power to cover their current and an-
ticipated customer load, it was simply not prudent to develop more (clean) 
energy facilities dedicated to specific customers.  Further, in the mid-1990s, 
many states “repealed or ignored” their IRP standards due in part to restruc-
turing in the electricity industry.194 
More recently, there is a movement to make the process more robust so 
as to include a better vision for a clean energy future.195  This was propelled 
forward in the 1980s, when states began adopting renewable energy portfo-
lios that required utilities to generate a certain amount of their energy from 
renewable sources.196  At that point, prudency determinations required utili-
ties to supply a certain amount of renewable energy.  However, most utilities 
met this requirement by adding new renewables to meet new demand.  The 
renewable energy was placed into the grid and co-mingled with energy gen-
erated from fossil fuel sources. 
Now, utilities are asked to supply certain energy from certain resources 
for certain customers with the end consumer requesting energy from a spe-
cific renewable resource.  With these specific demands, it makes sense utili-
ties involve large customers in the early decision-making process, incentiv-
izing large customers to remain with the utility via green tariffs or something 
similar197 instead of seeking out independent power producers or generating 
their own energy. 
Unfortunately, most utilities are not proactive in this regard,198 possibly 
because it is not that simple.  Utilities already have installed generation from 
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fossil fuel sources.  Assuming no increase in demand, adding renewable en-
ergy specifically for one large customer (basically fuel switching for one cus-
tomer) would result in an overage in energy generation.  The utility would 
need to shut down or limit the use of power generated from a fossil fuel power 
plant and curtail output, which would result in a large stranded cost to the 
utility and increased costs for existing utility customers.199 
Microsoft provides a recent example of regulatory requirements falling 
drastically behind consumer demand.  Microsoft currently plans to shift 80% 
of its power in the Pacific Northwest away from the vertically integrated util-
ity, Puget Sound Energy, to seek other options, such as PPAs with independ-
ent power producers who can provide greater renewable energy genera-
tion.200  In April 2017, Microsoft and Puget Sound Energy entered into a 
special contract settlement that requires Microsoft to pay $23.6 million in 
transition fees to offset the utility’s lost profits and stranded costs.201  Mi-
crosoft has historically been the utility’s largest customer; however, Puget 
Sound Energy was unable to meet Microsoft’s growing demand for renewa-
ble energy with 60% of its electricity generation from fossil fuels.202  Puget 
Sound Energy’s 40% renewable energy generation is significantly above 
Washington State’s renewable portfolio requirements of 15% by 2020.203 
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customer demanding renewable energy be required to pay for a portion of the transition cost like 
the Microsoft Special Contract?  Or, should all utility customers absorb the loss because it is for a 
common good?  Those are topics for another day. 
 200.  Hal Bernton, In Quest for Clean Power, Microsoft Wants to Bypass Puget Sound Energy 
Under New Deal, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/en-
vironment/microsoft-pse-reach-agreement-on-greener-energy/. 
 201.  Settlement Filed in Microsoft-PSE Energy Purchasing Proposal, WASH. UTIL. & TRANSP. 
COMM’N (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.utc.wa.gov/aboutUs/Lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=441&Source=https%3A%2F%2
Fwww%2Eutc%2Ewa%2Egov%2FaboutUs%2FLists%2FNews%2FAllItems%2Easpx&Con-
tentTypeId=0x010400FF58A04FBD57384DB60A5ECF52665206.  As more businesses leave the 
grid, the impact to utility companies is noteworthy.  For example, MGM Resorts recently announced 
it will pay $90 million to leave the grid in Nevada so that it can buy power from third party power 
producers.  Travis Hoium, Why Corporate America’s Love of Renewable Energy Should Terrify 
Traditional Utilities, MOTLEY FOOL (June 5, 2016, 9:07 AM), https://www.fool.com/invest-
ing/2016/06/05/why-corporate-americas-love-of-renewable-energy-sh.aspx (“Companies are look-
ing at renewable energy as a way to save costs, lock in rates, and go green, and they may have more 
power to upset the utility business model than even a million homeowners installing solar panels.”). 
 202.  Bernton, supra note 200. 
 203.  Renewable Energy Standard, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/de-
tail/2350 (last updated Nov. 19, 2015). 
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B.  Opportunities for Public-Private Collaboration 
This leads us to opportunities for collaboration and public-private part-
nerships for clean energy.  Perceiving these demand gaps, several collabora-
tions emerged over the last few years to help private businesses meet their 
renewable energy goals, in part by engaging utilities and raising awareness 
of the problem. 
For example, RE100 partnered with the Business Renewables Center, 
which was founded by the Rocky Mountain Institute.204  The purpose of the 
Business Renewables Center is to provide the tools to connect renewable de-
mand with energy providers.205  PPAs appear to be the main priority, as the 
collaboration sees PPAs as “a fast and effective way for large companies to 
fulfill their sustainability targets.”206  The Business Renewables Center’s goal 
is to procure 60 GW of off-site renewable energy for member companies by 
2030.207  It proposes to do so by providing the following tools: 
• A communications platform to raise awareness and cham-
pion successes and opportunities; 
• A community of leading thinkers and industry practition-
ers, who actively participate in identifying hurdles and so-
lutions to market growth; and 
• A knowledge base of known obstacles and proven solu-
tions, and software tools to facilitate transactions.208 
Another collaboration is the Renewable Energy Buyers Alliance 
(“REBA”), which is led by the World Wildlife Fund and the World Re-
sources Institute.209  REBA is a collaboration of sixty-five companies, “rep-
resenting over 54 million [MWh] of annual demand by 2020.”210  The col-
laboration seeks to identify easier paths for access to renewable energy,211 
with a goal to raise awareness of the renewable energy shortage and provide 
                                                          
 204.  RE100, supra note 15, at 10.  The Rocky Mountain Institute was organized by the Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation to address “relevant legal developments and issues.”  About the 
Foundation, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUND., https://www.rmmlf.org/about/about-the-
foundation (last visited Sept 26, 2018).  The Foundation is a “collaborative, educational, non-profit 
organization dedicated to the scholarly and practical study of the laws and regulations relating to 
mining, oil and gas, energy, public lands, water, environmental and international law.”  Id. 
 205.  RE100, supra note 15, at 10. 
 206.  What We Do, BUS. RENEWABLES CTR., http://www.businessrenewables.org/what-we-do/ 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
 207.  BRC: Business Renewables Center, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., http://www.rmi.org/busi-
ness_renewables_center (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  RE100, supra note 15, at 10. 
 210.  About Us, CORP. RENEWABLE ENERGY BUYERS’ PRINCIPLES, http://buyersprinci-
ples.org/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
 211.  CORP. RENEWABLE ENERGY BUYERS’ PRINCIPLES, http://buyersprinciples.org/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 16, 2018). 
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utilities with the tools to address it.212  For example, utilities and corporations, 
particularly tech companies, need to have robust and early conversations to 
incorporate more technological advances into the system and provide more 
opportunities for clean energy investment.213  REBA tries to connect large 
energy customers with utilities by relying on the following Corporate Re-
newable Energy Buyers’ Principles: 
• Greater choice in procurement options . . . [;] 
• More access to cost competitive options . . . [;] 
• Longer- and variable-term contracts . . . [;] 
• Access to new projects that reduce emissions beyond busi-
ness as usual . . . [;] 
• Increased access to third-party financing vehicles214 as 
well as standardized and simplified processes, contracts, 
and financing for renewable energy projects . . . [; and] 
• Opportunities to work with utilities and regulators to ex-
pand our choices for buying renewable energy . . . .215 
These collaboration efforts need to occur early and focus on customer 
trends—like corporate demand for renewable energy.  However, collabora-
tion efforts will have little benefit if states do not have integrated resource 
planning requirements that value the above principles.  For example, the 
least-cost and lowest-risk method for addressing long-term customer growth 
and demand should include a discussion about the possibility of major cor-
porate customers leaving the system if utilities are unable to provide clean 
energy.216  If Microsoft pays $23.6 million in transition fees just to leave the 
system, how much would it be willing to pay for clean, reliable, renewable 
energy?217  Maybe the least-cost, lowest-risk, long-term option is shutting 
                                                          
 212.  RE100, supra note 15, at 10. 
 213.  Priya Barua, Beyond the Monthly Bill: 4 Ways to Achieve Renewables Goals, GREENBIZ 
(Sept. 14, 2017, 12:35 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/beyond-monthly-bill-4-ways-
achieve-renewables-goals; Letha Tawney et al., 5 Emerging Trends for Corporate Buyers of Re-
newable Energy, WORLD RES. INST. (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/09/5-emerg-
ing-trends-corporate-buyers-renewable-energy. 
 214.  Resources are available to aid the formation of such partnerships.  For example, the World 
Bank’s Public-Private-Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Center offers help with the energy 
sector world-wide.  Their website is a good source for sample laws and regulations, sample energy 
agreements, and information on Clean Technology public-private partnerships.  Legal Issues on 
Energy and Power PPPs, PUB.-PRIVATE-P’SHIP LEGAL RES. CTR., http://ppp.worldbank.org/pub-
lic-private-partnership/sector/energy (last updated July 25, 2016). 
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ples.org/principles/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
 216.  WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 190, at 3; Davies & Luman, supra note 191, at 190–91. 
 217.  Microsoft worked with the Wyoming utility, Black Hills Energy, to collaboratively design 
a new tariff for its data center in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Herman K. Trabish, How Microsoft and a 
Wyoming Utility Designed a Data Center Tariff that Works for Everyone, UTILITYDIVE (Dec. 20, 
2016), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-microsoft-and-a-wyoming-utility-designed-a-data-
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down fossil fuel plants and building renewable energy plants to satisfy the 
growing customer demand for clean electricity. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Globally, there is a significant increase in corporate demand for clean 
energy.  This demand for clean energy could very well be the catalyst the 
industry needs to push it beyond fossil fuels.  Unfortunately, public utility 
companies are not as nimble as private corporations would like them to be, 
and they are unable to respond to this increased demand.  As a result, we are 
seeing multinational companies, like Apple and Google, generate their own 
energy or enter the energy market themselves.  This shift could have a sig-
nificant, negative impact on the existing energy delivery system.  Both fed-
eral and state utility commissions need to reconsider their regulatory frame-
work.  FERC needs to reevaluate its market power rule to determine whether 
it is sufficient to protect electricity consumers.  State utility commissions 
need to reevaluate their integrative resource planning requirements to ensure 
utilities are not bootstrapped into keeping fossil fuels on the system instead 
of meeting corporate demand for clean power.  Large multinationals have the 
means and motive to offer their products through an environmentally 
friendly, clean-energy manner.  This is the future with customers, sharehold-
ers, and investors demanding no less.  The goal, however, is to do so in a way 
that (1) protects the end consumer from unreasonable costs either associated 
with market manipulation or utility lost profits and (2) creates a more collab-
orative and thoughtful planning process for incorporation of clean energy. 
                                                          
center-tariff-that-work/430807/.  The Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Large Power Con-
tract Service approved a rate that will save Microsoft money and will not be detrimental to other 
ratepayers.  Id.  The approved tariff is not a renewable energy tariff but could provide a template 
for a future such rate agreement.  Id.  The agreement gives Black Hills Energy access to Microsoft’s 
onsite backup generation to meet peak demand needs and allows the utility to purchase power from 
the market on behalf of Microsoft at a firm price.  Id.  The tariff is open to any Black Hills retail 
customer with a load over 13 MW that can deliver similar generation.  Id.  The tariff shows the 
potential for the aggregation of renewable buyers who are too small to own an entire utility-scale 
installation.  Id.  Microsoft hopes that in the future utilities will lean on customer-sited resources 
such as their back-up generation.  Id. 
